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The Agrarian Political Economy of Left-wing Governments in Latin America: 
Agribusiness, Peasants and the Limits of Neo-Developmentalism  
LEANDRO VERGARA-CAMUS AND CRISTÓBAL KAY1 
This article concludes this special issue. It draws on the findings of the individual contributions and provides 
a comparison of the agrarian policies of left-wing governments in Latin America. The authors identify 
common trends and offer an explanation of why these governments did not change the agricultural model 
towards food sovereignty but continued to heavily support agribusiness while redirecting some resources to 
peasant producers. They improved living conditions of the rural poor, mostly through populist anti-poverty 
and social protection programmes financed by the commodity boom. They expanded programmes to integrate 
small farmers into commodity chains and improved working conditions of rural wage labourers, but did not 
carry out a redistributive agrarian reform. They instead continued to support agribusiness with numerous 
policies and measures. The authors argue that these governments did not curb the power of the dominant 
rural classes because these are highly intertwined with capital, making them part of a coalesced bourgeoisie 
that occupies key positions in the state. Leftist governments did not have a real agenda of social 
transformation or a strategy to tackle the rentier nature of the state. Contradictorily, their policies furthered 
peasant differentiation thereby weakening the previous alliance of rural subaltern classes. 
Keywords: agrarian policies, agribusiness, coalesced bourgeosie, neo-developmentalism, 
‗rentierism‘ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 22 2012, one day after an impeachment process had been initiated against him by the 
Chamber of Deputies, Fernando Lugo, the elected President of Paraguay, was removed from 
power by the Senate. Lugo, elected just four years earlier, had been the last candidate of the 
recent wave of leftist politicians to be elected to the highest office of their country in Latin 
America. No one could imagine it in 2012 but Lugo's fall was an omen of what was coming to 
Dilma Rousseff in 2016 in Brazil, the largest country of region.  
                                                          
1 Leandro Vergara-Camus is Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at the SOAS University of London. Cristobal 
Kay is Emeritus Professor at the ISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam. They wish to express their gratitude to the 
contributors to this Special Issue. They learned greatly from their papers and their findings were crucial to their 
analysis presented in this article. They also would like to thank all the anonymous reviewers who commented on and 
suggested modifications to all the papers, as well as the participants of the panel ‗Peasants, left-wing governments 
and neo-developmentalism in Latin America: exploring the contradictions‘, which the authors organized at the 
XXXIV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) held in 2016 in New York, for 
their comments on a very preliminary presentation of some ideas contained in this article. We are, of course, solely 
responsible for the views expressed in this article. 
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 As will become evident in this concluding article of this JAC special issue, the agro-
export boom and the expansion of agribusiness have been at the root of the success of most of 
the left-wing governments in Latin America. But all of these left-wing parties and politicians 
managed to get into government in the first place by promising to carry out land re-distribution 
and improve the living conditions of the rural poor, a promise they only partially fulfilled. 
Exploring the contradictions between the reality of the agrarian policies of these governments 
and their early promises has been a central focus of all the contributions to this special issue. 
Explaining the reasons behind this common trajectory, beyond the diversity of national agrarian 
structures, through an agrarian political economy analysis is the purpose of this conclusion.  
 For many, the experiences of left-wing governments in Latin America seemed to 
represent a new round in the debate on alternatives to neoliberal market-driven agrarian policies. 
These governments, supported or allied with rural movements, were going to be the first policy 
test for food sovereignty, which could be assessed by examining government policies on agrarian 
reform, support to small-scale peasant producers and family farming, restrictions on corporate 
agribusiness, environmental sustainability and other progressive aims. Our objective is to 
contribute to the discussion around food sovereignty and the literature on rural social 
movements and alternatives to neoliberalism. More than through a political and theoretical 
discussion on the nature, prospects and promises of peasant farming today, our aim in this article 
is to participate in these debates through an analysis of the concrete policies implemented by 
governments that have, at least rhetorically, taken up the idea of food sovereignty (Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela) or claimed to support peasant and family farming (Argentina and 
Brazil). 
 There is a great diversity in the ways agribusiness has developed and the type of insertion 
into the global food regime among the countries covered by this special issue (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela). There is also a great diversity in 
the size of their economy, their process of state and class formation, as well the state capacity of 
each of these countries. However, our main argument is that left-wing governments in Latin 
America have not significantly transformed the industrial agribusiness-controlled model of 
agriculture that they inherited from earlier governments. In fact, their policies have been 
instrumental for its most recent and dramatic expansion across the region. Although a substantial 
amount of land was distributed by the governments of Brazil and Bolivia, and to a lesser extent 
Venezuela, none of the Latin American left-wing governments has implemented a redistributive 
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agrarian reform that has significantly transformed the unequal distribution of land which 
historically characterises the region. However, these governments have deployed an array of 
policies to support small-scale producers that partly distinguish them from right-wing 
governments. Four types of policies have been implemented: 1) credit schemes for agricultural 
production; 2) policies linking family producers to a commodity chain; 3) the regulation or 
creation of privileged or protected markets; and 4) the institutionalisation of family farming 
within the state. Nowhere, even in countries where rural movements appeared to be stronger at 
the beginning of these governments (Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador), were rural movements able to 
influence or radicalise these policies, even where movement leaders were placed in positions 
within the state apparatus. There was in fact a significant loss of mobilization capacity on the 
part of peasant and indigenous movements that contrasts sharply with how compact, coalesced 
and organized the dominant agrarian classes have become. This situation calls for a renewed 
critical analysis of the balance of class forces in the countryside and in Latin America in general. 
But it also calls for critical assessment of the peasantry itself as the analysis of all the contributors 
to this special issue point to an increasing class differentiation within the peasantry. It appears 
that it was the middle peasantry, those with sufficient land and savings, instead of the poorest 
fractions, that benefited the most from left-wing policies; see Edelman and Borras (2016) for an 
analysis of how this plays itself out in transnational rural movements like La Via Campesina. 
 This article is organised in three sections. The first describes the main trends in the 
agrarian and agricultural policies of these governments. The second analyses these results in 
relation to the economic conjuncture of the 2000s and the balance of class forces existing at the 
time of the rise of the left to power. In this section, we argue that neoliberalism was in crisis in 
the early 2000s, but it was not an ‗organic crisis of hegemony‘ but rather in a ‗conjunctural crisis‘. 
Rural social movements had a strong capacity of mobilization, but urban labouring classes were 
disorganised and left-wing political parties in a well-advanced process of moving to the centre. 
The third section attempts to explain the limited achievements of the pink tide by taking a longer 
term perspective. By borrowing Zeitlin and Radcliff‘s (1985) Marxist concept of the ‗coalesced 
bourgeoisie‘, we argued that the rise of agribusiness has accentuated the fusion of the landed 
classes and the industrial bourgeoisie that was already evident in the 1960s. This has made them 
into a single class that has been able to temporarily bring the richer strata of the peasantry under 
its wing. 
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COMMON TRENDS AND DIFFERENTIATED PATHS  
The evidence and analysis provided by the contributors to this JAC special issue allow us to 
identify the following eight general trends around the agrarian political economy of the pink tide 
governments in Latin America. First, there was nowhere an agrarian reform of the magnitude 
required to have a significant impact on the unequal distribution of land inherited from the past. 
Second, where land has been distributed, the relative progress in women‘s access to ownership 
was due to the existence of autonomous rural women‘s movements. Third, the power of 
agribusiness was not challenged anywhere, but some policies to support family-farmers were 
created or expanded. Fourth, the state did take on a ‗new‘ role, but this role was guided clearly 
more by neo-developmentalism and agro-extractivism than by food sovereignty. Fifth, peasant 
and indigenous movements were paradoxically weaker or less able to mobilise support during 
these governments than in the past. Sixth, the landed classes proved to be resilient and were able 
to effectively influence policies and keep government attempts at reforms contained. Seventh, 
left-wing Presidents adopted very effective populist2 rhetoric, strategy and policies of class 
representation toward labouring classes. Eighth, though some efforts were made to address the 
problems and challenges faced by rural labour, no structural reform of the rural labour market 
was attempted anywhere. 
These general trends play themselves out differently in the countries of the region 
because of their distinctive histories, size, class and state formations, ethnic composition of their 
rural population, as well as the type of agribusiness formation and the strength or weakness of 
rural social movements. In this section, we will explore these general trends and differentiated 
paths through a description and analysis of the main agrarian policies of left-wing governments. 
 
Agrarian Reforms: Failed Opportunity 
Agrarian reforms have been put back on the policy agenda by rural movement since the 1990s. 
Latin American left-wing politicians having promised agrarian reforms during their electoral 
campaigns, their governments were expected to carry them out. But if none of these 
                                                          
2
 Populism here is used not as ―agrarian populism‖ or simply a ―way of doing politics‖ or ―political style‖. It refers 
to a political formation, often supported by a form of state, that allows for the representation of the interests of 
labouring classes through an unmediated relationship with the political leader. Populism is thus a politics of class 
conciliation, instead of class struggle, which impedes the independent and autonomous class formation of labouring 
classes. 
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governments can be said to have carried out a radical land re-distribution that modified the 
highly unequal land distribution, there was nonetheless some quantitatively significant land 
distribution in Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela (for detailed analysis see Webber; Sauer and 
Mészáros; and Purcell, respectively, in this issue). In Brazil, the four presidential administrations 
of the Workers‘ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) are said to have ‗distributed‘ over 51.2 
million of hectares to 721,442 families (Sauer and Mészáros, this issue), an area more than twice 
the size of Great Britain or equivalent to Spain, making this probably in absolute term the largest 
amount of land to be distributed on the planet in recent years. The PT governments (2003-2016) 
were responsible for 58 per cent of the total area distributed in Brazilian history and 40 per cent 
of benefited households (Silveira et al. 2016: 11-12). Some important caveats are required 
though. Firstly, in relative terms this is not as important as it appears, due to the sheer quasi-
continental size of Brazil and a renewed process of land concentration that has been taking place 
simultaneously. Indeed the area controlled by large properties (including by the state) passed 
from 214 million hectares in 2003 to 318 million in 2010 (four times the size of Britain, twice 
that of Spain), of which 244 million were in private hands (Farah 2015). Secondly, critical rural 
scholars have highlighted that land was really distributed only to between 120,000 to 250,000 
families, as most of the land was not distributed but regularized or legalized. This means that a 
huge number of families already had effective control of the land and their holding simply 
became legal. In addition most of the land was distributed in the Amazon and from public land 
rather than from the expropriation of private landowners (see Sauer and Mészáros, this issue). As 
a result, the agrarian reform in Brazil has had little impact on the extremely unequal land 
distribution.  
A similar outcome through a different route emerges in Bolivia. Until 2014, the 
government of Morales had distributed 28.2 million hectares to 369,507 beneficiaries, a bit more 
than half the area distributed by the PT but in a country eight times smaller. However just like its 
Brazilian counterpart, the Morales government distributed mainly public land and practiced 
similar favourable ways of presenting the data. In fact, it went further as this programme cannot 
really be called an agrarian reform because it is an enormous land legalisation and titling 
programme (Deere, this issue; Kay and Urioste 2007; Colque et al. 2016). The Morales 
government did innovate though by titling land through a new institution called ‗Territorio Indígena 
Originario Campesino’ (Indigenous Aboriginal Peasant Territory, TIOC) that replaced the ‗Tierra 
Comunitaria de Origen’ (Communitarian Land of Origin, TCO). Both formalized land of 
indigenous communities under a collective form but TIOCs are given more ‗autonomous 
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power‘, which the government has not always respected3. Of the 28.2 million hectares of land 
officially ‗distributed‘ until 2014, close to 15 million hectares (53 per cent) were titled as TIOCs. 
The Bolivian case may even be worse in some respect than the Brazilian one, as an important 
quantity of land (almost 14 per cent) has been distributed to medium and large property owners, 
including 56 titles to properties over 5,000 hectares (Webber, this issue). On a more positive 
note, however, both Bolivia and Brazil were the countries were more land was titled to women, 
either individually or as co-owner, to a great extent because of pressure from autonomous rural 
women‘s organisations (see Deere, this issue).  
It is important to highlight here that in both Brazil and Bolivia agrarian reforms were 
already being carrying out under neoliberal governments before left-wing parties won the 
Presidency. The agrarian reform of the PT government under Lula‘s administration is in clear 
continuation with that of the Cardoso government, who also settled families mostly on public 
land and in less agriculturally productive regions. In contrast, the MAS government under 
Morales first broke temporarily with his predecessors, but then backtracked in 2009 to more 
conciliatory positions. In the first phase, the Morales government introduced several procedural 
and institutional modifications to the law of agrarian reform to make land distribution easier and 
transformed the TOC into the more autonomous TIOCs. Morales also facilitated land titling to 
women (Deere, this issue). But in 2009, after striking an alliance with the landed bourgeoisie of 
the Eastern Lowlands, Morales effectively protected large properties by establishing a ceiling of 
5,000 hectares of land that can be owned by an individual, while allowing that limit to be 
multiplied by the number of associates participating in an agribusiness. Moreover, the law 
exempts large land properties existing before the enactment of the law (Webber, this issue).  
Venezuela is probably the most surprising, but also the most tragic, case of failed 
agrarian reform under a left-wing government. Indeed, by 2013 the government had 
redistributed 6.3 million hectares, regularised 10.2 million hectares and distributed 117,224 ‗cartas 
agrarias‘ (‗agrarian letters‘) which gave provisional usufruct rights to recipients, benefitting over a 
million people (Purcell, this issue; Enríquez and Newman 2016). Comparatively, land distribution 
also came with the creation of new state institutions and an investment of approximately $US 2 
billion in rural development. However, because of the economic crisis after the sharp fall in the 
oil price, the lack of adequate planning and monitoring within the state, the overvaluation of the 
                                                          
3 In a typically pink tide neo-extractivism manner, Supreme Decree 2366 of 2015 contradicts the autonomy granted 
to TIOC, as it authorizes hydrocarbon exploration and extraction within TIOCs and other protected areas (personal 
communication from Ben McKay). 
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national currency and the generalised practices of Bachaqueo, the reform fell flat (Purcell, this 
issue). This transfer of land to small-scale family producers, their organisation in collectives to 
generate economies of scale and the deployment of an arrays of supporting policies did not 
translate into a significant increase in land area under cultivation or increased production. It 
translated, as in other moments of Venezuelan history, in an extreme distortion of the 
productive sectors, namely agriculture, by the overwhelming dominance of the circulation and 
appropriation of the oil rent by all groups in society, though some obviously benefited more than 
others. 
 
Signs of Another Wave of Land Concentration? 
In Brazil and Bolivia, the expropriation of private properties was not the main policy tool of the 
agrarian reform. It was the registration or legalisation of land already occupied by peasants or the 
distribution of public land, either through land that is marginal for agribusiness or the 
colonisation of frontier areas. The latter has generally been the favoured way of distributing land 
to the rural poor in Latin America because it avoids having to challenge the interests of the 
landed class. Effectively, this means that everywhere in Latin America, including in Bolivia and 
Brazil, the existing high concentration of land in the hands of a minority has not been challenged 
in any way. Apart from the Brazilian case mentioned above, there were even signs toward 
renewed land concentration in Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay and Paraguay (Gómez 2014, Berry 
et al. 2014).  
The outlier in terms of unequal distribution of land in the region is Nicaragua, but not 
because of the actions of the current government of Daniel Ortega. Land distribution in 
Nicaragua is relatively more equal than in other countries of Latin America because of the radical 
agrarian reform of the Sandinista regime (1979-1989); and this even after a process of 
privatisation of land implemented by subsequent neoliberal governments. Though it has seen 
some process of concentration at the top, Nicaragua is the only country of the pink tide where 
small and medium-size producers control more than 50 per cent of the land. The case of 
Nicaragua under the Ortega government shows, however, that it is not the poor peasantry that is 
improving its situation, but rather those capitalist farmers holding between 35 and 141 hectares, 
who are able to link up with agribusiness (Martí i Puig and Baumeister, this issue).  
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If land was not distributed, could it be that land already in the hands of peasants was at 
least better protected by these governments, through a reform of the tenure system or of the 
property rights regime? In all cases, with the exception of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, left-
wing governments did not create a new institutional figure that could serve as an alternative to 
private property rights. In both Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, left-wing governments re-
introduced the requirement that property needs to fulfil its ‗social function‘, but it was the 
constitutional amendments and political settlement around indigenous autonomy in Bolivia and 
Ecuador that presents itself, potentially, as a brake on the privatisation and commodification of 
the right to land. The TIOCs in Bolivia and communal land in Ecuador could eventually 
represent some kind of refuge from market forces, but their importance is very limited and they 
have not impeded left-wing governments from encroach on those territories when the extractive 
imperative requires it (Bebbington and Bebbington 2011).  Hence, the process of the 
privatisation of the right to land and the commodification of nature was generally not 
substantially mitigated by these governments.  
 
The Undisputed Advance of Agribusiness 
None of the left-wing governments of this last wave modified the agribusiness-dominated 
agricultural model. All governments continued to support agribusiness especially that oriented at 
export. In several countries, agribusiness actually continued to expand geographically, sometimes 
dramatically as in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay, to such an extent that the 
term ‗Soy Republics‘ has been coined to refer to the dominance of this crop. Soybean 
production, although also produced by medium-size producers, is a sector that is dominated by 
large-scale industrial farming and agribusiness at almost all the stages. It provides a relative good 
reference point to measure the expansion of agribusiness. In Argentina in 1997 nearly 6.7 million 
hectares were planted with soybeans. It jumped in 2002 to 11 million hectares, close to a fourth 
of the country‘s arable land, and again to more than 20 million hectare in 2013, close to half of 
the arable land (Lapegna, this issue). In Paraguay, in 2000 soybean was planted on 1.2 million 
hectares of land. This jumped to 2.9 million hectares in 2012 and again to 3.2 million hectares in 
2015 (Ezquerro-Cañete 2016: 704). In Uruguay, the area planted with soybean was only 30,000 
hectares in 2001. It jumped to 1.3 million hectares in 2014 or 72 per cent of the cultivated area. 
In Bolivia in 2013, soybean was planted on 1,176,268 hectares, representing 35.5 per cent of the 
cultivated area compared to only 178,306 hectares at the close of the 1980s. It is today by far the 
This is the accepted version of article: Vergara‐Camus, Leandro and Cristóbal Kay (2017), “The agrarian political economy of 
left‐wing governments in Latin America: Agribusiness, peasants, and the limits of neo‐developmentalism”, Journal of 
Agrarian Change, 17(2): 415–437. Published by Wiley, available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12216  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23786/  
 
9 
 
most planted commercial legal crop in the country. In Brazil soybean has also expanded under 
the left-wing government of the PT. In 2003, the year that Lula da Silva took power, close to 
18.4 million hectares were planted with soybean. In 2016, the year Rousseff was brought down, 
the area covered by soybean was 33.3 million hectares (CONAB, 2016). 
Trends towards geographic expansion similar to that of soybean can also be observed 
across Latin America in a selected number of agricultural activities and crops, such as cattle 
ranching, forestry, sugarcane and palm oil. Flex-crops4, like sugarcane and palm oil (Borras et al 
2016), have been expanding but under a different logic than soybean. They have been benefitting 
from the creation of effectively protected markets established through blending mandates of 
agrofuels with gasoline adopted by several countries to mitigate climate change. In Brazil alone, 
the agricultural area planted with sugarcane has almost doubled between 2005 and 2013, when it 
reached close to 10 million hectares.  
The expansion of agribusiness over the countryside, particularly because of its enormous 
use of agro-chemicals, is having significant negative environmental impacts across the region, 
such as increased deforestation, loss of biodiversity, decrease soil fertility, surface and 
underground water contamination, as well as negative health impacts on the population. If 
another commonality stands out among the pink tide governments is that they did not elaborate 
more strict environmental regulation or increased the monitoring of the environmental impact of 
agribusiness. The decision taken by Brazilian President Dilma of pardoning the $US 4.3 billion in 
fines issued by Brazil‘s environmental protection agency (IBAMA) to large landowners when she 
ratified a new forestry code is a testament to this (Carter 2015: 417). The unwillingness to act 
against agrochemical aerial spraying in many South American countries, regardless of the 
growing scientific evidence of its damaging health effects and the mobilization of affected 
communities, is another one. Discourses of environmental sustainability or ‗buen vivir‘ have not 
had any traction what so ever on their policies. If we take into consideration that an important 
proportion of the production is exported, it makes sense to argue that the pink tide governments 
have increased the global metabolic rift and the unequal ecological exchange between the 
periphery and the core as well as endangering food security (McMichael 2008; Veltmeyer and 
Petras 2014; Gudynas 2015).  
This expansion has triggered a very significant increase in the price of land across Latin 
America. In Brazil, the average price of land increased by 430 per cent in 16 years between 1994 
and 2010 (Sauer and Leite 2012: 890-91). In Uruguay, it went from an average of $US 500 per 
                                                          
4
 Flex crops are those crops that have multiple uses such as for food, animal feed and fuel.  
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hectare at the end of the 1990s to an average of $US 3,519 per hectare in 2013 (Piñeiro and 
Cardeillac, this issue). An important trend within the land market is that a substantial amount of 
land is being bought by foreigners. In Brazil in the 2000s, 18.7 per cent of the properties 
registered and 20.1 per cent of the total agricultural area was in the hands of foreigners (Sauer 
and Leite 2012: 887). These properties tend to be very large and in states with high agricultural 
potential in sectors like cattle ranching, soybean and sugarcane. In Uruguay in 2000, 90 per cent 
of the land was in the hands of Uruguayans while in 2011 this proportion had dropped to 54 per 
cent (Piñeiro and Cardeillac, this issue). Translatino capital5 has poured into Paraguay as land was 
significantly cheaper as compared to the various neighbouring countries.  
 
Agribusiness and Market Concentration 
Agrobusiness has not only extended its grasp territorially, but also across the different 
commodity chains in agriculture. Market concentration has continued to be particularly acute in 
downstream activities, such as processing, commercialization and export. In Argentina in the 
mid-2000s, seven companies (Cargill, Bunge, Nidera, Vicentin, Louis Dreyfus, Pecom-Agra, and 
AGD) controlled 60 per cent of the agro-export market, Cargill alone exported almost 20 per 
cent of soybeans, more than 27 per cent of soybean oil and almost 22 per cent of soybean feed 
(Lapegna, this issue). In Paraguay in 2015, 6 companies control 70 per cent of the soybean 
export and almost the same five companies control 95 of the export of soybean derivatives 
(Vázquez 2016: 36). In Uruguay 10 companies controlled 86 per cent of the value of soybean 
export (Piñeira and Cardeillac, this issue). In Bolivia, 6 companies control 90 percent of soybean 
export (Webber, this issue). In Brazil, the situation is somewhat different as the capitalist 
modernization of agriculture came earlier in the late 1960s (Graziano da Silva 1981). Thanks to 
generous public credits, Brazilian agribusiness rapidly took a seat among the most powerful in 
the world and has been expanding across the globe, but primarily in South America. Brazilian 
agrarian capital is behind the soybean expansion in Bolivia and Paraguay, as is to a lesser extent 
Argentine capital in Uruguay‘s expansion. However, the same large TNCs (ADM, Cargill, Louis 
Dreyfus, Bunge and Syngenta) participate in the Brazilian market alongside Brazilian capital and 
concentrate the lion share of the profits.  
This general trend toward concentration is a bit more complex in upstream activities and 
varies according to commodity chains and countries. In soybean and cereals, agribusinesses of 
different sizes are involved in all the stages of the commodity chain, some rent land from 
                                                          
5
 This term is use to refer to capital from a Latin American country invested in another Latin American country.  
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medium or large landowners, and even from peasants, and engage in production, some 
companies simply provide producers with the technological package and others specialize in the 
processing, commercialization and export stages. As far as the labour market is concerned, this 
whole sector hires fewer and fewer rural wage-workers. In cattle ranching and meat production, 
agribusiness again adapts to local social and natural conditions. In South America, especially 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, it is transforming the traditionally extensive way of raising and 
fattening cattle by replacing it with more intensive methods such as feedlots. This is especially so 
in Argentina where between 2007 and 2010, thanks to government subsidies, the number of 
feedlots quadrupled, from 550 to 2770 (Lapegna, this issue). As a result, in Argentina the space 
that family producers occupied in the commodity chain has shrunk, as they are unable to access 
the capital required to invest in these innovations. In contrast, in Uruguay 61 percent of the 
family farmer continue to raise bovine cattle but their dependency to agribusiness, especially in 
respect to animal feed, has increased. Agribusiness in the cattle and meat sector has become 
more transnational, with translatino capital playing an important role in the Southern Cone but 
also internationally. Two of the largest meat processing companies of the world, Marfrig and 
JBS, are indeed Brazilian, with JBS accounting for 10 per cent of world meat production. As a 
result, in Uruguay of the 10 companies that control 77 per cent of the industry, only three were 
national, six were Brazilian and one was Argentine (Piñeiro and Cardeillac, this issue). In 
contrast, a country like Nicaragua can for the moment escape this trend toward the expansion of 
capital intensive forms of production and foreign control of processing and commercialisation. 
Although in Nicaragua the cattle ranching has doubled in terms of hectares dedicated to the 
activity as well as the heads of cattle between 2001 and 2015, most of the cattle ranching is still 
carried out by small and medium ranchers, with very low ratio of animal per hectare (Martí i Puig 
and Baumeister, this issue). 
In fresh fruits and vegetables, as well as cut flowers, agribusiness also has a commanding 
position. These crops are very capital intensive, require at substantial amount of energy and 
water, and are oriented at both the domestic and the global market, depending on the quality of 
the produce. In comparison to soy and cereals, however, they still require a substantial amount 
of seasonal wage-labour, very often women and sometimes child labour. Though they have been 
squeezed out of the export market and by some supermarket chains, peasant and family farmers 
still produce a substantial amount of the fruits and vegetables for the domestic market. Finally, in 
typically peasant crops, such as coffee and cacao, although there are some large plantations, 
production is still in the hands of peasant and family producers and agribusiness, both domestic 
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and foreign, focuses on controlling processing, commercialization and export. However, 
agribusiness has made important inroads upstream also in these crops with the intention of 
improving quality and traceability for niche markets. 
Scholars have been referring to this natural resource export trend as the re-primarization 
of Latin American economies or the return to a neo-extractivism (Cypher 2010; Acosta 2013; 
Burchardt and Dietz 2014). In this recent commodity boom, agro-export have hence accounted 
for a very important portion in the overall exports of most of the Latin American countries, 
while manufacturing has continued its decline initiated in the 1980s with neoliberal globalization.  
In Brazil, from 1999 to 2010 agricultural exports accounted for around 42 per cent of total 
exports – and only around 7 per cent of imports. The gross agricultural exports of US$ 96.75 
billion (and a corresponding net surplus of US$ 80.13billion) in 2014 broke all records (Sauer 
and Mészáros, this issue). In Uruguay in 2014, total exports were just over 10 billion dollars and 
76 per cent of those were agricultural and agro-industrial exports (Piñeiro and Cardeillac, this 
issue). In Paraguay in 2016, more than 83 per cent of the total exports were agricultural, with 
soybean and its derivatives representing 53 per cent and meat representing 18 percent (Vázquez 
2016: 34). In oil exporting countries, such as Venezuela and Ecuador, agro-export have not 
accounted for these high proportions of total exports, as an enormous portion comes from oil. 
They have, on the contrary, had difficulty stimulating their agricultural exports due in part to 
their overvalued currency and the circulation of oil rent throughout their economy (see Purcell, 
this issue). 
The policies deployed to support agribusiness have thus been different and have 
depended to a large extent on the size of the economy, the financial capacity of the state and the 
nature of agribusiness. In countries with larger economies and states with broader financial 
capacities like Brazil and Argentina, the state mobilised its full range of policy instruments: 
institutional reforms to protect land and intellectual property rights or facilitate purchase of land, 
investment in infrastructure, fiscal incentives, soft credits, direct subsidies, labour conflict 
mediation, favourable environmental regulations, etc. Because of its sheer size and capacity, once 
again Brazil stands out in the region. In 2015, the Brazilian government is said to have 
distributed 187.7 billion reais (U$ 46.6 billion) to agribusiness in a single year, mainly through 
credit to finance production, but also subsidies, debt equalization, purchase and price guarantee, 
stock exchange shares, etc. (Sauer and Mészáros, this issue; and see Carter 2015 for some of the 
most pro-agribusiness policies). In Argentina, the state also supported agribusiness, though in 
contrast to Brazil it significantly levied it with an export tax on soybean that reached 35 per cent 
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under the government of Kirchner and was maintained at this level by the subsequent 
government of his wife Fernández de Kirchner after an attempt to increase it failed in 2007 due 
to a vigorous campaign against it. But in typically Argentine populist tradition, the state took 
money from agrarian capital with it left hand and gave it back with its right one. Indeed, in 2007 
the Kirchner government allocated 1,400 million pesos (444 million dollars) in subsidies to 
agribusiness, 55 per cent of which were assigned to the ten largest companies. The confrontation 
with agribusiness over the increase of the export tax in 2007 did not change anything since 
between 2007 and 2010 the subsidies were 7,359 million pesos and again 80 per cent went to 
agribusiness (Lapegna, this issue). 
States with less financial capacities or with less political capacity or willingness to tax 
agribusiness, like Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay, not to mention Paraguay which does 
not impose any tax whatsoever, tended to adopt measures that support agribusiness 
institutionally such as protection of property rights, allocation of land titles and fiscal incentives 
(see the respective articles in this issue). Bolivia is probably one of the most surprising cases 
because the large capitalist producers of the Eastern Lowlands were historically the strongest 
allies of the Right and hence a target of the Left. Evo Morales‘ first three years were indeed very 
tense years of open confrontation with the landed oligarchy of that region. But after this initial 
conflict, which Morales managed to defuse, the state decided to support agribusiness in that 
region through institutional protection of large properties and the registration of more land to 
them (McKay forthcoming). As a consequence, the area planted with soybean soared multiplying 
by eight between the end of the 1990 and 2013 (Webber, this issue). 
 
Improvising support policies for peasants and family-farmers  
While all left-wing governments continued to support large-scale capitalist agriculture, it cannot 
be said that they did nothing for peasants and family producers. However, what is clear is that 
their policies, contrary to what could have been expected, were not inspired in the ideas of the 
food sovereignty movement. In a few countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the 
discourse of food sovereignty was used, and even enshrined in the constitution, but nowhere was 
it the ideological foundation of the agricultural policies supporting small-scale producers. Most 
governments seemed to have improvised the policies oriented at small-scale producers instead of 
having followed a clear agenda or programme. Most of them established policies that were in 
reality more poverty alleviating programmes. Some governments, for instance in Ecuador and 
Brazil and later in Venezuela — after its failed attempt to create a family-farming sector 
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(Enríquez and Newman 2016) — established policies to try to link-up small-scale farmers to the 
different agribusiness-dominated commodity chains. The furthest that a left-wing government 
went in terms of active policy to support family-farming was in Brazil with significant amount of 
funding and the creation of a protected markets for family-farmers through the local 
procurement of food by public institutions (see below). 
 Anti-poverty programmes, especially cash transfer programmes, were the main policy 
instrument of left-wing governments, who multiplied them to reach different constituencies, 
increased their coverage and raised the monetary allowance for them. These kinds of policies, 
though not supporting the productive capacity of peasants and family farmers, made a difference 
in the daily lives of the most marginalised agrarian sectors by reducing extreme poverty. Some of 
these policies were also implemented by many ‗non-pink tide‘ governments, though they were 
normally more targeted in their constituencies, less generous and their coverage was not as 
extensive. Hence, these policies cannot be said to be policies that tackle the root causes of 
poverty and allow the most marginalised sectors of the peasantry to build a capacity to reach 
some level of autonomy vis-à-vis the market or secure a space within the market. 
Some more clearly agricultural policies to support small-scale producers were 
nevertheless expanded or created by several left-wing governments, but they did not constitute  a 
long-term strategic plan to transform the agricultural model. These policies tended to be of four 
types: credit schemes for agricultural production, linking family producer to a commodity chain, 
the creation of privileged or protected markets, and the institutionalisation of family farming 
within the state.  
(1) The first type of policies distributed small credits to family farmers to help them 
improve their infrastructure, raise productivity, improve the quality of their crops, or generate 
new sources of income. Brazil has had these types of policies through its Programa Nacional de 
Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (National Programme for the Strengthening of Family 
Farming, PRONAF) since the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). 
Traditionally through this programme the state provided credits to agrarian reform settlers and 
family-farmers for planting, the purchase of equipment, animals and infrastructure, at low 
interest rates and with a reasonable repayment period. Some funds were also assigned to the 
creation or the development of groups, association, or cooperatives. During its time in power, 
PT governments substantially increased the budget and the type of agricultural activities that 
could be funded through this programme. It reached its highest point with 28.9 billion reais (US$ 
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7.2 billion) in 2015. Though important this may be, it still represents only 15.5 per cent of what 
was distributed to agribusiness that same year (Sauer and Mézsáros, this issue). Moreover, critics 
of PRONAF highlight that the credits are geared at the richer family farmers with the ability to 
repay (they capture 80 percent of the loans) and promote particularly their insertion in 
agribusiness-dominated crops, like soybean or sugarcane (Silveira et al. 2016). In Bolivia, the 
activities of EMAPA, the state-owned enterprise in charge of supporting food production, seem 
to follow the same logic as PRONAF in Brazil, as it concentrated the bulk of its 2011 budget of 
US$ 148 million in providing credit and support for family farmers to produce soybean in the 
region of Santa Cruz (Webber, this issue).Nevertheless no other country, not even Argentina 
comes close to Brazil in the disbursement of funding to family farmers.  
Argentina also had rolled out these types of policies long before Kirchner won the 
Presidency. They came under the umbrella of a programme called Programa Social Agropecuario 
(Social Agricultural and Livestock Programme, PSA). Kirchner did not significantly changed the 
programme, but he transferred the control of the state institution that implemented this 
programme to a peasant movement in 2007. However, Kirchner‘s need to reinforce the 
government‘s alliance with local governors led him to subordinate the programme to local 
governors, several of whom have historically been in conflict with peasant movements (Lapegna, 
this issue). In Uruguay the Frente Amplio government implemented policies that are similar to 
those taken in Brazil though much more modest in the budget (Peñeiro and Cardeillac, this 
issue). The Correa government in Ecuador took certain measures to support peasant and family 
farming, like the creation and promotion of alternative small-scale income-generating activities. 
An institutions to oversee these projects was created, the Instituto de Economia Popular y Solidaria 
(The Institute of Popular and Solidarity Economy, IEPS), and given a budget of US$ 9.5 million, 
though just like in Brazil it pales in comparison to the more than one billion and a half US 
dollars allocated to various projects to transform the economy. However, through one specific 
targeted measure the government allocated US$ 60 million for loans to small and medium scale 
farmers to improve the quality of their cocoa trees (Clark, this issue). 
(2) The second type of support policies attempted to link small-scale producers to 
agribusiness-controlled commodity chains. It would be difficult to argue, however, that these 
types of policies fall anywhere near a food sovereignty agenda, as the World Bank has been 
calling for this type of state intervention since its World Development Report 2008 entitled 
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Agriculture for Development, if not earlier.6 It is revealing also that no left-wing government 
attempted to elaborate policies that could lead to the growth or improvement of what could be 
considered markets that are in principle favourable to peasants or small-scale farmers (fair trade, 
farmers‘ markets or niche speciality markets). When they did take these types of measures, as in 
Ecuador with the creation and promotion of farmers‘ markets, they tended to be marginal to the 
general agricultural policy or the dominance of agribusiness in the commodity chain (Clark, this 
issue). The PT government in Brazil attempted this type of policy with the biodiesel sector 
through its Programa Nacional de Produção e Uso de Biodiesel (the National Programme of Production 
and Use of Biodiesel, PNPB). Critics who have studied the application of the PNPB argue that 
the programme does not effectively give the means to peasant producers to collectively set up 
their own production infrastructure, but rather subordinates them to large agribusiness 
corporations operating in the sector (Fernandes et al. 2010: 808).  
(3) The third type of support policy for small-scale producers involved market regulation, 
but also the creation of protected, nested or structured markets for family producers by the state, 
which was a feature in only three left-wing government: Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela. As far as 
we know, Ecuador and Venezuela, the largest oil producers of the region, were the only 
countries to establish guaranteed floor prices for commercial crops. These applied to a crop 
irrespective of the size of the farm though they were justified as a way to help the poorest 
producers. The case of Venezuela is an extreme case of capitalist rentierism distorting all the 
sectors, including the efforts to transform agriculture, making it difficult to use as a test case. 
(Purcell, this issue). But Ecuador did establish guaranteed floor prices for eight crops. However, 
it is not clear which types of producers benefited the most from this floor price policy. It is likely 
that medium and large-scale agricultural producers gain the most from this type of policies, as 
they tend to benefit from economies of scale and generally supply most of the protected crops.  
Brazil, under the PT governments, stands out with its public procurement programmes 
through which the federal government requires municipalities to buy food from family producers 
(Nehring and McKay 2013). The biggest of these programmes is the Programa Nacional de 
Alimentação Escolar (National School Feeding Program (PNAE), with a budget of 3.8 billion reais 
(US$ 1.15 billion) in 2014, of which 1.14 billion reais (US$ 340 million) was reserved for the 
direct purchase of family farming products. Since 2009, the federal government requires 
municipalities to buy 30 per cent of the food for school meals from family farmers. The vast 
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majority of the municipalities (60 percent) have not yet reached the 30 percent mark (Schneider 
et al 2016). Another of these programmes is the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food 
Procurement Programme, PAA) that also promotes the purchase of food from small-family 
farmers by state institutions, such as local public school, feeding programmes, food banks, 
community kitchens, charitable associations and community centres. The food is bought by 
these institutions at fair prices based on the regional market average and donated to the 
population facing food insecurity. 
(4) The fourth type of support policies toward small-scale producers came by way of the 
institutionalization of the category of family-farmer and the formalization, creation or increase 
funding for state institutions responsible for this sector. Indeed, with the exception of Brazil 
were such an entity already existed, almost all the left-wing governments created a state 
institution to attend to the interests of small-scale producers. In Bolivia Morales created the 
Ministry of Rural Development and Land and the Empresa de Apoyo a la Produccion de Alimentos 
(EMAPA); in Ecuador Correa created the Ministry of Social and Solidarity Economy; in 
Argentina, Kirchner created the Secretary of Rural Development and Family Farming; in 
Venezuela a whole set of institutions were created to replace private companies, see Purcell in 
this issue; and in Uruguay the FA created the General Directorate for Rural Development within 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle Ranching and Fishery. This is one of the common measures 
of these left-wing governments and it is significant that such institutions did not exist before 
their arrival to power. It is certainly one of the ways in which left-wing governments sought to 
officially recognise the importance of family-farming and allocate funds and administrative 
resources directly to small-scale farming. These institutions were also the space within the state 
apparatus where peasant organizations and allied intellectuals had more influence, though some 
of these were barely more than empty shells. Whatever the case may be, it is noticeable that one 
of the first measures as interim President taken by Michel Temer, who replaced Dilma Rousseff 
after her impeachment, was to abolish the ministry of agrarian development (MDA) which is 
responsible for agrarian reform and family-farming. 
 
Tackling Rural Labour Markets 
Because peasant movements, and not rural unions, have been at the forefront of resistance to 
neoliberalism for the past two decades scholars and activists have given less attention to rural 
labour issues than to land conflicts. The transformations of the world of rural work are 
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nonetheless extraordinary. There has been a major shift from relatively permanent rural 
employment to temporary employment as well as an increasing participation of women in the 
rural wage labour market, albeit under precarious conditions (Deere 2005). Peasant households 
have increasingly been forced to find off-farm employment largely as wage labourers in 
agricultural activities but increasingly also in non-agricultural jobs. Ongoing processes of 
pluriactivity, de-agrarianization, proletarianization, flexibilization and feminization have been 
intensified with the shift to non-traditional agricultural exports such as soy, palm oils, fruits, 
horticulture and flowers, stimulated by neoliberal globalization. The use of labour contractors by 
employers has become more common. These contractors take advantage of the vulnerability of 
wage labourers who are competing for jobs, as these have become scarcer, by often not 
complying with the labour legislation and demanding long working hours or intensifying work 
through payment by result. Most of the contributors to this special issue have highlighted the 
loss of jobs that has accompanied the expansion of agribusiness and mechanization of 
agriculture. Thus increasingly rural labourers have to migrate within the country and beyond its 
frontier so as to find a job and through their remittances help to sustain the peasant household 
(Kay 2017a).  
As working conditions and wages are generally not regulated in Latin America and trade 
unions tend to be very weak or non-existent, it is important for rural workers that the state 
intervenes to limit the many abuses suffered by wage workers in the countryside. This is an area 
in which left-wing governments distinguish themselves from their right-wing counterparts. Many 
pink tide governments took measures to increase the minimum wage, to regulate the rural labour 
market, and provide wider access to pensions. In Ecuador under the Correa government the 
minimum wage doubled and subcontracting of labour, which allowed employers to avoid their 
legal obligations to workers, was made illegal. However, the problem in Ecuador as well as other 
pink tide governments has been in applying the law and sanctioning the offenders. The FA in 
Uruguay was very active in extending most of the social and labour rights such as collective 
bargaining, eight hour working day and regulated breaks that urban workers had had for many 
years to rural workers. It doubled the minimum wage and created a special unit for rural labour 
within the ministry of labour. In Brazil between 2003 and 2010, the minimum wage increased 81 
percent even after inflation was taken into account (Sauer and Mészáros, this issue) and the levels 
of labour formalization in agriculture have improved from 33 percent in 2004 to 50 percent in 
2013 (Silveira et al. 2016: 4). Although important, these measures have not established any solid 
foundation for rural labour to recover some of its mobilization and representation capacity. 
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Nowhere, with the exception of Uruguay, were labour unions empowered with legal reforms that 
could have made unionization and collective bargaining easier and more effective. 
 
NEO-DEVELOPMENTALISM: INTERPRETING CONTRADICTIONS, EXPLORING 
LIMITATIONS 
In order to explain the types of agrarian and agricultural policies we have to distinguish between 
factors that are the result of the conjuncture of the 2000s from those that stem from the 
historical changes that have happened in the Latin American countryside, which are linked to the 
longue durée and the nature of class and state formation in Latin America. This section deals with 
the former and the following section will address the latter. 
 
The Long Commodity Boom, Progressive Policies and Social Mobilization 
While the period of intense rural mass mobilisation of the 1990s —in particular in Brazil, Bolivia 
and Ecuador — coincides with an economic crisis experienced by labouring classes through 
rising unemployment and inequalities, the relative economic and social success and sustained 
popularity of pink tide governments stood on the shoulders of the recent ‗long commodity 
boom‘, which to a large extent was fuelled by the Chinese demand (Jenkins 2011). This 
favourable conjuncture led leftist governments to fall in the easy temptation of ‗progressive neo-
extractivism‘ or what could be called ‗social rentism‘, i.e. allowing extractivist production to 
continue to thrive while using the government income it generates to fund social programmes. 
With the commodities boom in many Latin America countries levels of employment rose, 
poverty significantly decreased and income inequality declined, albeit marginally (CEPAL 
2016:50). Rural poverty tended to decline fastest in those countries which rolled out different 
types of cash transfer programmes for the poor which were principally significant in countries 
with left-wing governments but not necessarily confined to them. Brazil‘s Fome Cero (Zero 
Hunger, later Brasil Sem Miséria) programme was particularly innovative and was emulated by 
various countries. The incidence of rural poverty between 2000 and 2012 declined most in 
Ecuador, i.e. by 49 per cent, followed by Brasil (44 per cent), Bolivia (34 per cent), Paraguay (31 
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per cent) and Nicaragua (15 per cent)7. While rural poverty in 2012 varies from 65 per cent in 
Nicaragua to 31 per cent in Brazil, it is only 2 per cent in Uruguay (CEPAL, FAO, IICA 2015: 
2008). 
Although it is difficult to establish an unequivocal correlation, social mobilisation 
attracted less people during this long commodity boom, even though there were numerous 
conflicts between peasant and indigenous communities and extractive industries and agro-export. 
The hegemonic character of the national celebration of the export boom, be it based on oil, gas, 
mining or agriculture, certainly made it more difficult for groups resisting extractivism to make 
their voice heard.  The consolidation of agribusiness because of this favourable conjuncture and 
its way of interlocking with the interests of different sectors, including some capitalised small-
scale family farmers, placed a wedge between the richer peasantry and the poorer peasantry and 
landless rural workers. If the crisis of the 1990s created fertile ground for class unity among 
them, the economic boom of the mid-2000s blurred things and suddenly several sectors of the 
peasantry, especially peasants with sufficient land and some saving, as well as unionised rural 
workers, saw the importance of a thriving agribusiness sector. For these sectors land struggle or 
agrarian reform, not to mention a radical transformation of the agricultural model, was no longer 
a priority in countries where it had been during the 1990s, such as Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
As we have seen in the section describing the policies of left-wing governments, several policies 
that supported peasants and family-farmers were policies that actually supported the middle and 
richer peasantry. The pink tide policies that supported small-scale farming in a sense came to 
reinforce the ongoing internal class differentiation, while the anti-poverty policies supported the 
income of the poorest sectors of the peasantry. 
The case of Brazil is a perfect example of this situation. From the 1990s until the first 
years of the Lula government, the internal strength and vitality of the MST relied on maintaining 
an alliance between the ‗land-poor‘ peasants, the landless rural workers and the threatened small-
scale capitalist family producers. Similarly, its external political projection relied on reproducing 
this intra-class alliance with organisations like the Movimento de Pequenos Agricultores (Movement of 
Small Farmers, MPA) and the rural unions within the Confederacão Nacional de Trabalhadores na 
Agricultura, (National Confederation of Agricultural Workers, CONTAG). However, the MST 
was never able to become hegemonic within rural social movements as rural unions were already 
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adopting more conciliatory stands and avoiding strikes by the beginning of the 2000s. But 
through these not always tensionless alliances, land reform, policies to support family farming 
and improvements of working conditions became shared demands of all rural movements vis-à-
vis the state and against agribusiness (Vergara-Camus 2014: 232-41). The commodity boom, 
especially the expansion of soybean (and sugarcane until 2013), provided the context for a 
contradictory convergence of interests between small landed producers, unionised rural workers 
and agribusiness(see Lapegna 2015).  
The case of Ecuador and Bolivia also show the importance of the new conjuncture that 
made confronting agribusiness less attractive to certain sectors of the peasantry. The Bolivia case 
resembles that of Brazil the most, as a sector of the poor indigenous peasantry seems to have 
transformed itself through internal social differentiation into a petty-capitalist fraction linked to 
the soybean complex. Important sectors of the indigenous middle peasantry, traditionally strong 
supporters of the MAS, are probably less vocal for a radical agrarian reform than they were in 
the past (Webber, this issue). In Ecuador the situation seems less clear, as agribusiness is neither 
of the size that it is in Brazil or even in Bolivia, nor soybean the crop of choice of agribusiness 
expansion. However, the mass mobilisation of indigenous peasants for agrarian reforms has been 
extremely difficult and modest considering the high degree of land concentration and Correa‘s 
failure to implement any significant land redistribution. Henderson (2016) explains the lack of 
real capacity of peasant organisations like the FENOCIN and CONAIE to mobilise their 
militant base in favour of agrarian reform with the fact that grassroots members of the biggest 
movements tend to already be landed and are more interested in government support for 
agricultural production, or because the land question is more an issue for the Andean peasants 
than a real national question. In addition, rural unions in Ecuador represent proletarianized rural 
workers, which have historically been fragmented and focused on struggle for better working 
conditions, and their links to peasant movements were not very strong. This make the 
development of a common agenda among rural movements very difficult. 
The other factor related to the conjuncture of the early twenty-first century in Latin 
America that can explain the form that pink tide government policies took combines the 
‗legitimacy‘ or ‗organic‘ crisis of neoliberalism and the relative weakness of the radical left. Four 
contributors to this special issue (Ezquerro-Cañete and Fogel, Lapegna, Webber) use Antonio 
Gramsci‘s idea on social change and moments of economic crisis. Lapegna and Webber use 
Gramsci‘ concept of the passive revolution, which the Italian communist developed to describe 
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the way in which several European countries adopted bourgeois institutions facilitating capitalist 
development without having to go through a revolution, as the French did in 1789 (Gramsci, 
1971:114-120). In general terms, the concept refers to the contradictory situation in which a 
regime incorporates some ideological elements (and organic intellectuals) of the revolutionary 
forces in order to respond to the challenges and new requirements of the capitalist system, 
without radically transforming the class relations that sustain the system of domination. Indeed 
several authors explain the contradictory nature of the pink tide in Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador 
and Brazil by arguing that these governments produced passive revolution because they have 
exhibited an ability to incorporate ideas like ‗buen vivir‘, ‗food sovereignty‘ into a nationalist or 
anti-imperialist discourse as well as some social movement leaders into the state administration, 
while maintaining the core of the neoliberal model unchanged. There is a great deal of truth in 
this description, but using the concept of passive revolution is a bit like identifying a diagnostic. 
The concept is better at describing the symptoms than at explaining the causes of how and why a 
social process takes this form. The balance of class forces, the nature of the political leadership, 
and the social form taken by class organisation are important causes of the generation of a 
passive revolution. Marx (1963) in the 18th Brumaire speaks of the emergence of a Bonaparte, a 
political saviour and opportunist that can take power, when a society faces a situation in which 
no class is able to impose its domination. Similarly Gramsci speaks of a situation of ‗organic 
crisis‘ when no class is capable of becoming hegemonic and of the emergence of a Cesar that 
plays the same role of the Bonaparte for Marx (Ezquerro-Cañete and Fogel, this issue). These 
concepts can provide a key to understanding the why these left-wing governments did not 
produce more radical changes with respect to agrarian and agricultural policies. 
Latin America is the region that pioneered neoliberal policies, these policies being 
implemented in varying degrees already by the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is also among the 
first regions in which the economic crisis that neoliberal restructuring triggered, regardless of the 
recovering rates of economic growth in certain countries in the early 1990s, turned into a 
legitimacy crisis. This was the case in most of the region, but the more acute cases were 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Brazil. Two paths can be identified here: a Right-
wing (Neoliberal Populists) one and a Left-wing (Neodevelopmentalist Populist) one. In some 
countries, a right-wing neoliberal populist leader, often with a business background, presented 
himself as the saviour of the poor: Carlos Menem (1989) in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori (1990) 
in Peru, Fernando Collor de Mello (1990) in Brazil, and Vicente Fox (2000) in Mexico. This first 
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path proposed to solve the economic crisis by radicalising the neoliberal reforms and failed for 
the most part, as it simply exacerbated the contradictions of neoliberalism.  
The second path of resolution of the crisis of legitimacy of neoliberalism came in general 
chronologically later in the 2000s, often after a serious debacle or a financial shock like in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela. In class term, at the top neoliberalism was 
facing an re-accommodation of the power bloc, in which the ruling class alliance fractured and 
the role of the finance bourgeoisie in particular as the leading class within the dominant bloc was 
temporarily questioned. This seems to be more clearly the case in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. The case of Brazil is more a case where financial capital is not discredited but accepts 
to give room to other sectors of the bourgeoisie (Morais and Saad-Filho 2005, 2011) and these 
sectors take a chair at the high table of the state. Simultaneously, at the bottom, some sectors of 
the subaltern classes (indigenous, peasants and unemployed) managed to mobilise and organise 
mass protests, but they were often not matched in this by urban labouring classes. In Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Brazil, where peasant movements were the strongest, movements managed to 
extract significant concessions from neoliberal governments in the 1990s. But they were already 
on the decline before the access of leftist forces to government in Ecuador (Clark, this issue), 
Bolivia (Webber 2011) and Brazil (Vergara-Camus 2014: 232-256). In the cases where they 
created or participated in a political party, like Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Nicaragua, and gained 
some political momentum, they tended not have a clearly defined political programme of 
reforms and policies. Compared to the 1990s, the position of the peasant movement in the 
2000s, even in the strongest cases, is one where they only have some mobilization capacity, but 
are weak in their political organisation. In Nicaragua peasant movements had already been 
displaced and in Venezuela they were practically inexistent as a political force. In the cases where 
the political party that they supported had been running for elections for some years, as with the 
PT in Brazil, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, MAS) in Bolivia, the Frente 
Amplio (Broad Front, FA) in Uruguay and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, (Sandinista 
Front of National Liberation, FSLN) in Nicaragua, the ideology of the party moved closer and 
closer to the centre as the year passed. Hence, the class conjuncture in which many pink tide 
governments emerge is one where class forces balance each other out and no class emerges as a 
clear ‗leading class‘.   
However, these were more cases of ‗conjunctural (or occasional) crisis‘ that Gramsci 
distinguishes from ‗organic crisis‘ in his notes on the Modern Prince. The former is a crisis where 
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the political leaders are the target of attacks, while the latter is where the whole model of 
domination is put into question (Gramsci 1971: 177-78). These were not cases of hegemonic 
crisis of neoliberalism, even in countries like Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador where the discredit 
of neoliberalism was probably the deepest. However, following Marx‘s analysis in the 18th 
Brumaire, the political conjuncture was perfect for the appearance of a Bonaparte. In the context 
of the 2000s, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Néstor Kirchner in Argentina in particular represent 
perfect cases of Bonapartism. These leaders took power in a situation of crisis and first establish 
opportunistic alliances with social movements, before fatally weakening them through a subtle 
combination of repression, co-optation and transformismo8. Kirchner‘s case is a peculiar one 
because he managed to enlist on his side contradictory and even antagonistic groups such as the 
Piqueteros, poor urban popular sectors, local peasant and indigenous movements, as well as pro-
agribusiness authoritarian provincial governors, which only Argentine populism can assemble.  
Where the popular movements had kept a certain control over the political party, like in Bolivia 
and Brazil, the President still had a significant amount of power vis-à-vis the movements. 
The situation in which no class force emerges as the leading class without being an 
‗organic‘ but a ‗conjunctural crisis‘ explains why several left-wing leaders had to strike an alliance 
with quite conservative sectors of the Right to reach power. Analysts tend to forget that the 
running mate (and later Vice-President) of Lula Da Silva was José Alencar, from the Liberal 
Party of Brazil. This alliance had to be reworked with another force of the Right, the Partido do 
Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, PMDB) that had 
supported the previous military dictatorship, when Dilma chose Michel Temer for Vice-
President. He would later lead the impeachment process against her and become President 
himself. It is also often forgotten that Néstor Kirchner also had a right-wing running mate, Julio 
Cobos, who was a politician from the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union, UCR). Julio 
Cobos also played a critical role against Kirchner when he casted the decisive vote in Senate to 
bring down the motion to increase the export tax on soybean in 2007. In Paraguay Fernando 
Lugo was the left-wing politician that arrived to power in probably the weakest position. He had 
to strike and alliance with the centre-right Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (Authentic Radical 
Liberal Party, PLRA), the right-wing opposition had a majority in both houses of Parliament, and 
he was even in a minority in his own governing coalition.  
                                                          
8
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right-wing governments or forces or when leaders switch from one party to the other without any ideological 
coherence (Gramsci, 1971: 58-59). 
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Hence the policy choices of left-wing government were very often restrained from within 
their own political coalition. Nowhere was this more evident than in Brazil, where the PT 
accepted to relinquish the control of the ministry of agriculture to agribusiness (Mészáros and 
Sauer, this issue), while populating the smaller ministry of agrarian development with peasant 
movement activists or intellectuals close to them. Thus, the Right did not lose its access to the 
state although it lost the Presidency. In many countries, it remained powerful in the Parliament, 
the bureaucracy and the judiciary, as well as in several regions of these countries. Moreover, the 
extractive imperative of the left-wing governments ensured that the doors of the presidential 
palace were never closed for them. 
Right-wing forces were however not only present inside these governments, but rapidly 
reorganised themselves to confront it from the outside if needed. In the early years of left-wing 
governments in Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay, the landed classes reacted vehemently 
to the threat or mere possibility of a redistributive agrarian reform. In Venezuela in the early 
2000s, the opposition carried out its failed coup and economic boycott, and presented the 
agrarian reform as an attack on private property at large. In Brazil the year 2003 was marked by 
the reappearance of public demonstrations of the União Democrática Ruralista (Democratic 
Association of Ruralists or Democratic Rural Union, UDR), the organization defending large 
landowners, to oppose the increase in land occupation by landless peasants and rural workers. 
Throughout the PT governments, large landowners and agribusiness also continued to work in 
Parliament through their ‗bancada ruralista‘, a pressure group of around 200 elected official, and 
created enquiries and commissions to scrutinise and criminalize the activities of peasant 
movements (Sauer and Mészáros, this issue; Carter 2015). In Bolivia, almost right from the 
beginning the government of Evo Morales had to confront a quasi-secessionist movement in the 
Lowlands provinces of the Media Luna, which saw the landed elite use violence against 
indigenous and peasant movements allied to Morales (Webber, this issue). However, only in 
Paraguay did landlords, almost on their own, deemed it necessary to bring down the elected 
President Fernando Lugo, who they saw as a threat to their interests because he had not 
decisively acted against land occupation and had previously tabled a motion to introduce an 
export tax on cereals of a mere six percent (Ezquerro-Cañete and Fogel, this issue).  
 
From Autonomy to Clientelism, from Anti-neoliberalism to Neo-Developmentalism 
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As was shown above, many of the measures and policies implemented during by these 
governments produced significant positive though not path-breaking effects for peasants and 
family producers. However, not in a single country were peasant movements able to successfully 
pressure the government into taking more assertive measures. The weakness of the movements 
was increased either by the corporatist origin or the clientelist tendencies dominating within 
Latin America social movements. In Brazil, these characteristics were already well established 
when Lula became President, the large unions, including the rural CONTAG, preferring to 
participate in the different type of neo-corporatist consultative councils that exist instead of 
mobilizing their membership to pressure the state. Correa, Lula, Chávez, Evo can all in different 
degrees be said to have fostered clientelist linkages with the grassroots membership of the great 
majority of the social organisations, while attempting to co-opt their leaders. On their part, social 
and peasant movements, beyond their demand for autonomy have remained state-centric in their 
strategies. Once these governments offered positions within the state many of these movements 
lost their ability to mobilise their basis in exchange for very little influence on the political or 
policy process. They ended up at the mercy of state programmes over which they had very little 
input. Moreover, they did not have their own self-sustained autonomous model of development. 
It was as if movements thought that the state would deliver the goods and if it did not, they 
would have the strength to pressure it. They did not. On the contrary, the movements that 
decided to confront the state‘s extractivist agenda were criminalised and marginalised in Bolivia, 
Ecuador (Bebbington and Bebbington 2011), as well as in Brazil. 
 To be fair though, the parties that came to power with this pink tide, if they were still 
anti-neoliberal in their propaganda, did not have a real alternative to offer. This is another reasin 
why we cannot speak of a real crisis of hegemony of neoliberalism.  Across the pink tide, with 
the partial exception of Venezuela —where some kind of socialist agenda of nationalization, 
workers control and participatory working class democracy has been attempted (although fuelled 
by oil rents and populism)—, food sovereignty, buen vivir, agro-ecology and so on did not 
challenged the core of the neoliberal hegemony.  The market and the private sector remained the 
privileged actors and most of the agricultural policies were oriented at accelerating capital 
accumulation and deepening market integration. The notable difference was that the state took 
on a more active role in stimulating and orienting economic growth and deepening the export-
orientation of the economy. It also played a role in the redistribution of part of this growth 
toward labouring classes. If these governments were not hard core neoliberal governments, they 
firmly remained within its compounds by mutating into neo-developmentalism.  
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 In contrast to what some authors like Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012) argue, these left-wing 
governments were not post-neoliberal, if we understand it to be beyond neoliberalism (see Petras 
and Veltmeyer 2017). In our view these regimes are best characterized as neo-developmentalist. 
They all pursued a development strategy in which they sought to strengthen the state, which had 
been significantly trimmed down during the neoliberal period, so as to intervene more on the 
market and steer the development process in a desired direction, i.e. towards a more diversified 
and technologically advanced economic structure as well as to a more socially inclusive and 
egalitarian society. While some governments (re)created new state enterprises, reversing some 
privatizations, or re-nationalised (Venezuela) or increased their royalties and participation in the 
extractive industries (Bolivia, Ecuador), these initiatives were few and certainly did not recreate 
the pre-neoliberal developmentalist state of the import-substituting and protectionist 
industrialization era, with the exception of Venezuela. One of the important objectives of neo-
developmentalism is to choose the right sector and champions and establish the conditions for 
their market success, with the idea that it is necessary to grow before redistributing. In 
agriculture, we have seen that this view has translated in supporting agribusiness and exports 
while diverting some of the state funds to support the small-scale producers that have the ability 
to integrate successfully into the market. 
While these governments made significant advances in social policy, social inclusion and 
poverty reduction as already discussed, they were unable or unwilling to transform the country‘s 
productive matrix as some of the left-wing governments had proposed in their development 
programmes such as ‗buen vivir‘ (Ecuador), ‗vivir bien‘ (Bolivia) or ‗socialism of the 21st century‘ 
(Venezuela). Such as transformation of the country‘s productive structure requires developing 
new activities, largely linked to the industrial and service sectors, which generate higher value 
added, promise greater possibilities for productivity growth and can find an expanding world 
market for its products and services. The aim is to diversify the economy and reduce the 
dependence on primary commodities. These were not novel ideas, however, as they had already 
been proposed by staff of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) in a series of publications during the late 1980s and early 1990s. With these 
writings ECLAC attempted to find a space alongside neoliberalism without completely 
abandoning its structuralism – hence their development proposal was labelled neo-structuralist.9 
It is surprising that the left-wing government generally did not acknowledge that their 
development ideas were significantly influenced by neo-structuralism. In a way neo-
                                                          
9
 For an analysis of structuralism and neo-structuralism, see Leiva (2008) and Kay (2017b). 
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developmentalism is the child of neo-structuralism though missing in practice its core proposal 
of the productive transformation which drew on the successful development experience of 
South Korea and Taiwan. These governments were largely seduced by the more easily achievable 
neo-extractivist policy, to which they attached some neo-structuralist elements of market 
steering.10 
 
COALESCED BOURGEOISIE, NEOLIBERALISM, RENTIER STATE 
The neoliberal reforms since the 1980s, in which the privatization of land and tax incentives and 
credits to the agribusiness stands out, gave a new impetus to large agricultural properties. In 
many cases, these reforms contributed to transforming the remaining ‗traditional landowners‘ 
into large modern capitalist farmers who are tightly inserted into the global circuit of capital. In 
most cases, the social sector that was created during the agrarian reform is stagnating and large 
sectors of the peasantry cannot reproduce themselves without the income from temporary 
employment or migration. In agriculture, the state has been replaced by national and 
transnational agribusiness, as capital has extended its control over agriculture from inputs (seeds) 
to consumer markers (supermarket chains). Technological innovation and production 
certification have a clear preference for the large capitalist production because they require 
significant capital investment and a flexible labour market, often only providing temporary and 
precarious work. Levels of exploitation and labour productivity demands have dramatically 
increased. Financialization has also made significant advances through mechanisms such as crop 
insurance, hedge funds or ‗futures‘ that speculate on price changes of crops (the case of soybeans 
is emblematic).  
In this context it is helpful to refer to Marx‘s concept of the ‗coalesced bourgeoisie‘ 
(Marx 1963), a situation that arises when the ties that bind the different fractions of the 
bourgeoisie and landed property reached a level at which the distinction between capitalists and 
landowners is abolished. In a pioneering and fascinating study Maurice Zeitlin and Richard 
Ratcliff (1988) apply and enrich Marx‘s concept of the coalesced bourgeoisie to analyse the 
composition of Chile‘s dominant class up to the 1960s and their capital accumulation strategies. 
They concluded that the Chilean ruling class was composed of great landowning families whose 
members are simultaneously principal owners of capital, top executives of larger corporations, 
                                                          
10
 These comments apply to a lesser extent to Brazil as the country was already more industrially advanced and the 
State had retained many of its developmentalist features during the neoliberal phase as compared to the other pink 
tide countries.  
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and key political figures within the state (Parliament, state bureaucracy, and government). They 
also showed that the Chilean landed capitalists had chosen for many years to actively imbricate 
their economic interests with foreign capital through the ownership of stocks in foreign 
corporations and through their direct participation, or that of a relative, in the executive boards 
of foreign companies operating in Chile. Zeitlin and Radcliff (1988: 238-9) called these 
mechanisms ‗the ties that bind‘.  
In the corporate food regimes of the globalisation era the links between the different 
fractions of the Latin American ruling classes have coalesced even further. As can be seen in 
several contribution of this special issue, the fusion between agriculture and industry within 
farming through the rise of agribusiness and processing plants, as well as outside farming proper 
with merchant capital (supermarkets) and financial capital (insurance companies, investment 
funds, banks) has aligned the most powerful rural classes with capitalist sectors. Although it is a 
general trend and takes on very different form in different countries, this fusion is probably 
much more acute and complex in the largest and most capitalist agricultures of the region, like 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, and less so in the smaller ones like Ecuador, Nicaragua, and 
Paraguay. In Argentina, finance seems to have created a new model with its ‗pool de siembra‘ 
(‗sowing pools‘) that goes well beyond conventional linkages between capitalist farmers and 
agribusiness companies (Lapegna, this issue). Agriculture is once again a good business 
opportunity for capital and this has led to a new wave of land grabbing in many Latin American 
countries, internationalisation of Latin American (particularly Brazilian and Argentinean) agrarian 
capital, the increase presence of transnational agribusiness (independent or through merger and 
cooperation with national agribusiness) and the multiplication of technical agricultural service 
providers (Borras et al. 2012). This means that profitable agriculture is no longer simply about 
the control of land but is a lot about the highly advanced technology, biotechnology, advanced 
management systems for increasingly complex value chains and a highly flexible labour regime. 
Different capitals come together but large agribusiness capital extends its reach through the value 
chain. As we have seen, agribusiness produces ‗interlocking chains‘, weaving more firmly 
together various forms of capital beyond landed capital: finance, logistics of the value chain from 
the farmer to the supermarket, infrastructure such as silos, processing and packing plants, 
services for technology, biotechnology seeds and new irrigation and farming techniques. Hence, 
the ‗ties that bind‘ have been extended further to include not only bourgeois sectors, but also 
petty-bourgeois ones such as specialized service providers (professionals, labour contractors, 
technicians, marketing experts and others) and even sectors of the peasantry.  
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Neoliberalism, Rentierism, and the State  
If we understand rentierism as made of a series of wealth accumulation strategies that relies 
broadly speaking on a monopoly or monopoly-making position, be it private land property, state 
office, officially-granted quasi-monopoly over a sector (energy, telecommunication, transport, 
agrofuels), rentierism is a practice that is prevalent within contemporary capitalism. Though 
contradictory if understood from classical Marxist theoretical definition of capitalism, where 
capitalism is defined as being characterised by the separation from the economic and the political 
and capitalist accumulation is driven by the imperative of market competition, rentier strategies 
can be fully consistent with really existing capitalisms. Indeed, rentier strategies of wealth 
accumulation can be understood as ways of bypassing, or restricting, market competition by 
securing politically-protected market control. The private sector thus can be heavily reliant of 
rentier strategies of wealth accumulation, but so can a sector of the ‗political class‘.  
We argue that combining Marx‘s and Zeitlin and Radcliff‘s idea of the coalesced 
bourgeoisie with the idea of rentier capitalism inspired in Marx's concept of ground-rent helps us 
make sense of the essential form that capitalist farming is taking in Latin America in the early 
twenty first century. We are not only witnessing the era of the financialisation of the economy, 
including the agricultural sector, but we are also witnessing the rentierisation of the economy. Under 
neoliberalism, political power and access to the state has become determinant for the strategy of 
several capitalist actors. In Latin American agriculture, this ‗rentierisation‘ of agriculture is 
translating itself in the following three strategies:  
First, agribusiness firms are able to expand their reach and increase revenues as much 
through their political leverage than through their ‗market power‘. They do so by gaining 
monopoly control of a sector, as in soybean export, or being given monopoly power by the state 
in a certain sector such as intellectual property rights over seeds or agrofuels at pre-established 
prices for blending mandates. 
Second, some formerly dominant classes and fractions of classes at the top, especially 
large landlords, which were unable or unwilling to transform themselves into large capitalist 
producers, have allied themselves to dominant capitalist groups. They extract ground rent by 
renting out land to (or investing their surplus in) agribusiness companies. 
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Third, some sectors of the subordinated classes or fractions of classes at the bottom that 
managed to maintain their access to land, i.e. middle and rich peasants, have also aligned 
themselves with agribusiness. The expansion of soybean production in South America is actually 
being accompanied by the emergence of a ‗petty rentierism‘. Small and medium size producers, 
who do not have sufficient funds or prefer not to risk losing their land if they engage in farming, 
rent out their land to large capitalist producers and sometimes sell their labour power to them. 
We are seeing a new phenomenon of ‗too poor to farm, but rich enough to rent out‘. 
In sum, the power of the dominant classes in the countryside, even the top strata of the 
peasantry, has never been as intricately linked to those of leading capitalist sectors of the whole 
economy. This stands in sharp contrast to the process of precarization, fragmentation, 
demobilisation or even repression that peasant and rural workers have faced and are enduring 
under neoliberalism. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE END OF A CYCLE 
With the defeat of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in December 2015 in Argentina, the removal 
from power of President Dilma Rousseff in May 2016 in Brazil, and the debacle since the death 
of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, the latest cycle of left-wing politics has come to an end in Latin 
America. The corruption scandals, implicating the Workers‘ Party (PT) among many others 
parties and the above mentioned removal of Dilma Rousseff is an historic moment not only for 
Brazil but for the Latin American Left in general. Not simply because of the size and importance 
of Brazil in the region, but because Brazilian social movements and parties played a key role in 
the renewal of the Latin American Left under neoliberalism, through fora and coalitions, such as 
La Vía Campesina and the World Social Forum. The fall of the PT, especially the way in which it 
has fallen, dramatically closes the latest cycle of popular mobilisation that began in the early 
1980s with the rise of new unionism and saw the emergence of a democratic, radical and 
pluralistic Left, preoccupied at first as much with reaching political power than with changing 
society and the way of doing politics within social and political organisations. The PT was already 
no longer the PT of its origins when ‗Lula‘ won the Presidency in 2003, but that past remained in 
the background and the PT still had important connections to social movements, which yielded 
some progressive changes in terms of affirmative action policies. Leftists will look back at this 
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experience with a sense of disappointment and despair, as they will at the other experiences in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela.  
The contributions to this JAC special issue have highlighted the specific characteristics of 
each country, the peculiar confluence of interest between the state and agribusiness, and the 
particular policies oriented at large-scale farming and peasant and family farming. This 
concluding article summed up the findings and identified similarity and difference. However, the 
general finding is that there was not a substantial change in the agricultural model. In policy 
terms, the two most important missing elements were the lack of redistributive agrarian reform 
and the lack of a programme of reforms to place peasant and family farming firmly at the centre 
of sustainable and egalitarian model of agricultural development. In absence of a redistributive 
agrarian reform that would have distributed land to landless peasants and rural workers, the 
concentration of land and the marginalisation of small-scale producers were not properly tackled. 
The policies that supported small-scale producers ended up being policies for the middle and 
richer peasantry. No plan was drawn up to begin to reorganise the peasant sector so that it could 
acquire some kind of collective dynamism, through the creation of cooperatives, networks, agro-
industries, instead of isolated policy oriented the individual producer. Similarly, most anti-
poverty measures simply temporarily alleviated the levels of poverty through a variety of 
subsidies and income support measures which are dependent on the ability and willingness of 
governments to provide. 
What will happen now that the commodity boom has vanished, the state will not have 
the financial resources to fund the cash transfer programmes and the millions of rural poor do 
not have land upon which to fall back on, albeit for self-consumption? The end of the 
commodity boom exposes the shaky foundations of all this and the lack of solid base from 
where to rebuild. Banking on agribusiness and extractivism was probably the worst mistake of 
left-wing governments because if its boom allowed them to remain in power and redistribute 
some of the national income to popular classes, its recent bust has displaced them from power 
and they will not have much to show their political constituency other than a temporary increase 
in disposable income. The coming crisis will surely rearticulate the different class interests within 
the peasantry, including that of the middle peasantry who stands to lose in the economic 
restructuring that will come.   
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Lessons for the Left: Confronting the Spectre of Rentierism and Neo-Populism 
These left-wing governments had the good fortune of arriving to power and governing during a 
long commodity boom, which made them easily fall into what we called a ‗state social 
rentierism‘. It was much less dangerous and challenging, not to say more electorally rewarding, 
for them to surf the wave of the commodity boom than to begin to build a new sustainable 
agricultural model on the promised ideas of ‗buen vivir‘ and food sovereignty. The main agrarian 
challenge of the Latin American Left, including parties and social movements, in this last decade 
has not necessarily been the issue of choosing between doing this ‗within‘ or ‗outside the state‘. 
Although this is an important question, the main challenge was rather how to deal with a rentier 
capitalist state, entangled within an agribusiness-led agricultural market. The ways the different 
governments and political parties have tackled this issue and the class alliances that they have 
struck have been fundamental in determining the path that each country has taken. These have 
varied from almost classically populist path (Argentina) to reconstituted landlordism (Paraguay), 
with all kind of shades of neo-populism in between: neo-developmentalist populism (Ecuador), 
sub-imperialist developmentalist populism (Brazil), political patrimonial rentierism (Nicaragua) 
and neo-nationalist modernising populism (Bolivia). The term neo-populism is probably the 
most appropriate because left-wing governments remained firmly within the realm of the Latin 
American style ‗national-populist‘ politics, which have always signalled a tension within working 
classes between corporatism and self-organisation or autonomy.    
The political lesson in all this is that in some sense the Latin American Left, even in the 
cases where social movements had played a key role in challenging neoliberalism as in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil, was much weaker than most analysts argued, and that labouring 
class forces did not have the autonomy and the level of class consciousness that many thought. 
Right-wing forces were much stronger than most thought on the left and neoliberal hegemony 
was weakened but not in crisis. The scholars that see autonomy as a viable strategy (Zibechi 
2010; Escobar 2010; Vergara-Camus 2014) probably failed in properly analysing the conjuncture. 
However, the more conventional Marxist analysts did not fare much better at forecasting the 
outcome either. Gaining access to the state did not end up yielding more concrete results than 
building autonomy from below and outside the state, as some authors like Atilio Borón (2012) 
proposed.  
Some authors (including Webber and Lapegna in this issue) have resorted to Gramsci‘s 
concept of the ‗passive revolution‘ to describe this outcome characterised by a complex 
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combination of reform and restoration. Following Gramsci, we could also add that this lack of 
long-term strategy was the result of the Left‘s own strategic decisions. The Latin American Left 
simply traded the ‗war of position‘ (hegemony within civil society) for a ‗war of manoeuvre‘ 
(access and control of state institutions), without having properly won the ‗war of position‘ or 
without thinking that it was important to continue to carry the struggle on both fronts.  
This strategic focus on gaining access to state power by most of the parties of the Latin 
American left revealed their inability to deal with the rentier character of the state, still to a great 
extent in the hands of conservative forces, the control of markets by agribusiness and a lack of 
long-term strategy of most of the Left. It did not have for instance a plan on how to slowly 
rebuild a peasant economy in the shadows of an agribusiness-dominated agriculture. It did not 
either have a clear idea of the types of reforms or policies that were required to empower and 
promote peasant producers and family farmers, nor the sequence of these reforms. Finally, any 
class hegemony or agenda of social transformation needs to also build new social relations of 
production, such as new ways of organising production, new ways of exchanging and new forms 
of property relations. This is probably where the pink tide of the 2000s produced its most 
resounding defeat. Absolutely nothing of this kind was attempted. 
In reality what these cases show is that contemporary leftist movements and parties have 
not reflected on the possibility or necessity of establishing new societal forms within civil society 
as an important element of any long term strategy. The belief that in one way or another power 
is concentrated in the state still dominates the thinking of the most important sectors of the 
Latin American left. The most tragic example of this is to be found in the long march of the 
Brazilian PT toward electoral respectability. In the 30 years from its creation to its electoral 
victory at the Presidential election of 2003, the PT abandoned all its original thinking with 
respect to internal party democracy, participatory processes and workers control in the 
workplace. It moved electoral campaign after another closer to an almost typical clientelist 
populist party. When the time came to call in ‗the masses‘ to support it from the coup, they were 
no longer there (or not in the numbers required). Instead of using its partial access to the state to 
build an active, politicised and supportive citizenry, the PT itself contributed to turn it into a 
clientelist network. To be fair though, the PT included more participatory processes than any 
previous government. However these were basically consultative bodies and backroom deals 
came to dominate policy-making.   
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What may be the way forward? No one really knows. But an essential ingredient for a 
recovery of peasant movements has to be the strengthening of the organization of peasants and 
rural workers and the building of broad-based class alliances within rural and urban sectors. 
Another ingredient will be the re-invention of class-based left-wing parties that will include 
mechanisms, such as limitation and revocation of mandates, rotating leadership and collective 
leaderships, which will avoid the appropriation of the party by professional politicians and the 
development of clientelist practices. This is not an easy task for sure, especially for rural 
movements in a context where the rural population is diminishing, agriculture is more and more 
controlled by agribusiness, and the ruling class is now a new coalesced bourgeoisie. 
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